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ABSTRACT  
The purpose of this thesis is to provide insight into 
the potential benefits that Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) technology may provide USSOCOM and other commands in 
the Global War on Terror. This thesis will explain the 
basic concept behind RFID, and cite some of the current day 
applications of today that are revolutionizing the civilian 
sector. More importantly, this thesis will introduce 
conceptual security applications that could benefit USSOCOM 
today, highlighting the possible successes and downfalls 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Since the terrorist acts of 9/11 the United States has 
had to make many adjustments in order to improve the 
security of the nation and its interests abroad.  Within 
days of the attacks, the United States responded to the 
terrorist network responsible for those attacks by 
initiating the Global War on Terror (GWOT).  At first there 
were many successes in both Afghanistan and Iraq, but as 
the passing of time has shown, what seemed to be a 
relatively easy objective has evolved into a complex 
endurance event.  Some experts agree that the solution will 
most likely involve massive and lengthy efforts at 
addressing the underlying causes of this global insurgency.  
With no relief in sight, some citizens of the United States 
have grown weary of their government’s efforts and are 
concerned over the growing number of U.S. casualties.  The 
potential length of the GWOT, coupled with the cost in 
terms of money and human life places considerable pressure 
on the Department of Defense of the United States to end 
the war in Iraq. 
In April of 2006, six former generals from the United 
States armed forces began to openly criticize the Secretary 
of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, for the difficulties the armed 
forces faced in Iraq.  One of the critics, retired Marine 
Lieutenant General Gregory Newbold, formerly the Pentagon’s 
top operations officer, was quoted in Time magazine as 
saying, “We need fresh ideas and fresh faces. That means, 
as a first step, replacing Rumsfeld and many others 
2 
unwilling to fundamentally change their approach.”1  While 
this thesis in no way addresses the performance of any 
leaders in the United States government, it does deal with 
Lieutenant General Newbold’s suggestion of fresh ideas and 
a fundamental change in approach.   
While it is possible that some aspects of the GWOT 
could take decades to change, a greater sense of security 
is needed now in order to establish the foundation toward a 
better future in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Throughout history it has been necessary for some leaders 
and governments to impose a relatively extreme form of 
social control to keep order and effectively govern the 
people.  In today’s GWOT, the United States does not have 
the required manpower to maintain accountability over the 
populations in countries in which we are currently 
involved, but perhaps by using technology which is already 
available, the United States can gain the upper hand 
against the terror network.  
A. PURPOSE  
This thesis provides insight into the potential 
benefits that Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
technology may provide USSOCOM in the Global War on Terror.  
Secondly, this thesis provides a basic background of RFID 
technology and explains some of its current applications 
today.  Finally, this thesis recommends two applications of 
RFID technology that can benefit the U.S. efforts in the 
GWOT, and discusses their advantages and disadvantages. 
Chapter II of this thesis provides a basic 
understanding of what RFID is, key terminology, and how it 
                     1 Reuters, “U.S. Retired Generals Debate over Rumsfeld,” MSNBC 16 
April 2006 [website]; available from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ 
default.aspx?id=9974867; accessed 21 April 2006. 
3 
works.  Chapter III will explain some of the current 
applications of RFID today.  Chapter IV explains two 
applications for RFID technology, which could help the 
governing body gain the advantage over its adversaries.  
Chapter V covers the potential advantages and disadvantages 
of implementing these RFID concepts, and Chapter VI 
provides a summary of the thesis. 
B. RELEVANCY 
As of 1 June 2006 there were 2,764 members of the 
United States Armed Forces listed as killed in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.2  This growing number has caused much debate in 
the United States’ political realm and has also triggered  
military leaders to ask how they can  lessen the loss of 
American lives.  For example, the Improvised Explosive 
Device (IED) accounts for more then 32 percent of US 
fatalities in Iraq.  These high figures have solicited a 
great response from some organizations, including the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, which has 
created an entire graduate level seminar dedicated to 
producing countermeasures to combat the lethality of IEDs.  
Similar to IEDs, vehicle-related deaths caused by hostile 
intentions are one of the leading causes of fatalities 
amongst members of the U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq.3  Without 
question it is to the benefit of the Department of Defense 
to explore every possible solution in reducing U.S. 
fatalities in war torn areas.    
                     2 Department of Defense, Daily Casualty Report, 1 June 2006 
[website]; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf; 
Internet; accessed 1 June 2006. 
3 Michael White, “Iraq Coalition Casualty Count,” Icasualties, 1 June 
2006 [homepage]; available from http://www.icasualties.org/oif/ 
default.aspx; Internet; accessed on 1 June 2006. 
4 
As demonstrated by the Malayans and British in Malay 
during the 1950s, providing security to the people is 
essential in defeating the insurgency.4  With this principle 
in mind, it should be the intent of the government to gain 
as much information about the insurgents as possible, in 
order to reduce Iraqi and U.S. fatalities.  Nathan Leites 
and Charles Wolf, insurgency experts formerly employed at 
The Rand Corporation, suggest that “efficient action 
requires information.”  Additionally, Leites and Wolf point 
out those members of an insurgency have greater potential 
to gather information than the government they oppose.  
Leites and Wolf explain that the government has a greater 
challenge in collecting information on the insurgents, 
because the insurgent must “play it safe.”  The insurgents 
must remain “small, invisible, tightly organized, highly 
security-conscious, and hard to penetrate” in order to 
ensure their survival.  As a result, gaining information on 
these organizations is a great challenge for governments.  
On the other hand, insurgents often have an advantage in 
collecting information on the authorities, because they are 
“large, visible, usually loosely organized, and easy to 
penetrate.”5  It is this void of information that can 
perhaps be filled by using RFID technology. In turn, this 
could result in greater security and possibly change the 
direction of the counter-insurgency mission in Iraq.  
 
 
                     4 Frank Pelli, “Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Marines in 
Vietnam,” Global Security, 1990 [report online]; available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/PFD.htm; 
Internet; accessed 8 June 2006. 
5 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Rebellion and Authority: An 
Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts, (Chicago: Markham Publishing 
Company, 1970), 132. 
5 
C. REFERENCES AND DEFINITIONS 
First, it is important to understand that even though 
there are many references to Operation Iraqi Freedom 
throughout this thesis, by no means are the concepts that 
are recommended within exclusive to that country.  However, 
to date, Iraq is the dominant area of operations for the 
United States Armed Forces and the greatest source of U.S. 
fatalities in terms of the GWOT.  Therefore, Iraq is a 
prime example for this thesis, but the recommendations 
within are designed to be applicable in any unstable 
country.  Additionally, with Iraq being one of the primary 
fronts in the GWOT, it has received much attention from the  
media, which inherently includes a greater number of 
reports, more statistics, and general analysis than other 
countries involved in the GWOT.  Consequently, this 
provides more supporting information for the thesis. 
The “Global War on Terror” is an ambiguous phrase, 
because by definition, we are not truly facing terrorists.  
The opponent the United States and its allies confront 
today may be better understood as a network of 
organizations involved in a global insurgency.  While the 
enemy may use tactics of terror, they are still insurgents 
and therefore they will be labeled as such throughout this 
thesis. 
Lastly this thesis will often refer to specific 
configurations of RFID tags, RFID readers, and databases as 
“RFID technology”.  This has been done to simplify the 
reading, but it should be noted that this term is only 
referencing the specific configurations mentioned in 
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II. WHAT IS RFID 
A. THE ORIGINS OF RFID 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is currently 
being used in various applications all around the world.  
An average citizen in the United States may come in contact 
with RFID technology a few times a day, and in most cases 
it will be transparent to them.  The frequency in which 
RFID is being used is growing at a rapid rate, and in time, 
will most likely impact most people’s lives.  While RFID 
may increase efficiency and provide benefits to businesses, 
it will probably remain unnoticed to most consumers.  
Nevertheless, it is important to understand the technology 
that is being used. The main intent of this chapter is to 
provide an understanding of the origins of RFID and a basic 
overview of how RFID works.  
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology 
is an automatic way to collect asset data 
(identification, location, transaction, time) 
quickly and easily without human intervention or 
error.6 
There are very few definitions for RFID listed in 
today’s dictionaries, such as the one quoted above. 
Logically, one may assume that RFID has not yet hit the 
mainstream dictionaries, such as Webster, because it is 
such a new technology.  However, this is not the case; RFID 
tags with rewritable memory were first given a patent in 
the United States in 1973.  It was also in the 1970s that 
that the U.S. Department of Energy asked the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory to develop a method which would help 
                     6 “Introduction to RFID,” Identec Solutions, [homepage]; Available 
from http://www.identecsolutions.com/ intro_to_rfid.asp; Internet; 
accessed 3 May 2006. 
8 
keep track of the nuclear material within the United 
States.  Using radio frequency, the scientist working at 
the laboratory placed a transponder in the trucks carrying 
the nuclear material.  When it approached an entrance or 
exit at a secure facility, a corresponding reader would 
detect the signal and provide the identification of the 
shipment, and perhaps other additional information, such as 
the identity of the driver.7  
While RFID technology existed in the 1970s, the roots 
of RFID trace back to World War II.  The discovery of radar 
played a large role in the war and lent to the basic 
concepts of RFID.8 Radar provided a great advantage to both 
sides in the war by giving advance warning to those on the 
ground of an approaching aircraft.  However, the one 
significant disadvantage that radar suffered from was its 
inability to distinguish the identity of the aircraft, 
friend or foe. In response to this weakness, the Germans 
discovered that if the aircraft were to change its flight 
orientation, then it would register differently on the 
radar signal by reflecting a more unique signature.  As a 
consequence, the German pilots made it their standard 
operating procedure to execute a roll on their approach 
back into their home base, thus providing the German radar 
operators with an identifiable signature.  While there was 
no transponder on the planes themselves, the Germans 
manipulated the aircrafts orientation in order to reflect a 
different signal back to the radar, essentially 
                     7 “The History of RFID Technology,” RFID Journal [journal online]; 
available from http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/ 
1338/1/129; Internet; accessed 21 April 2006.  
8 Jeremy Landt, Shrouds of Time: The History of RFID, AIM [whitepaper 
online]; available from http://www.aimglobal.org/technologies/rfid/ 
resources/shrouds_of_time.pdf; Internet; accessed 26 April 2006. 
9 
transforming the entire aircraft into a transponder.  This 
application is recognized by some as the first passive RFID 
system.9   
B. HOW DOES RFID WORK 
Before understanding how an RFID system works, it is 
helpful to first become familiar with the components.  
There are two main components of an RFID system: the tag 
and the reader. 
1. The Tag 
A radio frequency identification tag “is a device that 
can store and transmit data to a reader in a contactless 
manner using radio waves.”10  Tags are the foundation of a 
RFID system, without them the other components would have 
no function.  RFID tags are also commonly referred to as 
transponders within the RFID community, and to further 
complicate things, there are many different forms that the 
devices come in such as smart labels, simple tags, or smart 
cards.11  However, to keep things simple, this document will 
refer to them only as tags.  The tag itself is the 
component which is affixed to the object that is to be 
identified, such as the RFID chips placed under the skin of 
animals for identification purposes.  Perhaps the largest 
distinguishing factor from one tag to the next is whether 
or not it is a passive or active tag. 
                     9 “The History of RFID Technology,” 1. 
10 Sandip Lahiri, RFID Sourcebook.  (Upper Saddle River: IBM Press, 
2006), 9.  
11 “Glossary of RFID Terms,” RFID Journal [journal online]; available 
from http://www.rfidjournal.com /article/articleview/1338/1/129; 
Internet; accessed 21 April 2006. 
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Figure 1.   Various passive tags. (From: RFID 
Sourcebook, p. 13) 
 
The passive tag, unlike the active tag, does not have 
its own power source, such as a battery.  Passive tags, as 
the name implies, are passive in the sense that they do not 
transmit any information regarding their identity until 
they are prompted to.  Even once they are prompted by a 
reader to wake up, the passive tag does not transmit its 
own signal; instead it reflects the signal that the reader 
sent initially, thus returning a unique identity.  Not 
needing to power its own signal, passive tags require less 
subcomponents and have no moving parts.  Therefore, passive 
tags tend to be smaller than active tags.  While the 
smaller size may offer some advantages, this may come at 
the expense of the tag’s capabilities.  Typically, the 
range for a passive tag is between 1 inch and 30 feet.12  
Generally speaking, passive tags are less expensive than 
active tags and vary in price from 20 cents to several 
dollars.  Tag prices may reflect many different factors.  
The first factor is the frequency at which the tag 
responds; high-frequency tags, for example, require more 
copper in the antenna, thus raising the price.  The amount  
 
                     12 Lahiri, 9. 
11 
of memory a chip offers, the packaging around the tag, and 
the quantity ordered are a few other factors that can 
affect the price of a passive tag.13 
 
 
Figure 2.   An active RFID tag. (From: RFID Sourcebook, 
p. 18) 
 
Active tags are different in that all of them have 
their own power supply.  This is what enables an active tag 
to transmit its own signal and not have to rely on the 
reader.  While this does offer more capabilities to the 
tag, it also increases its size.  One of the most 
significant increases in capabilities is the range from 
which a reader can detect the tags signal; some tags can be 
read from 300 feet away.13  Additionally, the microchips in 
active tags are typically larger and offer greater 
capabilities than those in passive tags.  Of course, 
greater capability comes at a greater price; active tags 
typically range from $10 to $50 a piece.  Cost factors 
include the size of the battery, the memory in the 
microchip, and the packaging around the tag.  
 
                     13 “RFID System Components and Costs,” RFID Journal [journal online]; 
available from http://www.rfidjournal.com /article/articleview/ 
1338/1/129; Internet; accessed 21 April 2006. 
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2. The Reader 
A RFID reader, also known as an interrogator, is 
described by one expert as “a device that can read from and 
write data to compatible RFID tags.”14  Readers, like tags, 
come in two variations, stationary and handheld, both of 
which offer different capabilities at different prices. 
 
 
Figure 3.   A fixed RFID reader. (From: RFID Sourcebook, 
p. 26) 
 
Stationary readers, commonly referred to as fixed 
readers, are permanently affixed readers.  These may be 
placed on portals, walls, street lights, or any other 
suitable object; however, these readers are not confined to 
static objects.  For example, a stationary reader may be 
mounted onto a police car, as suggested later in chapter 
IV, and still engage with signals as they pass by tags 
within range.  Stationary readers are generally less 
expensive than handheld readers and are more prevalent in 
the industry today.15 
                     14 Lahiri, 22.  
15 Ibid., 26. 
13 
 
Figure 4.   A handheld RFID reader. (From: RFID 
Sourcebook, p. 30) 
 
Handheld readers are sometimes referred to as mobile 
readers.  However, one key difference is that a mobile 
reader may not require a person to hold it and may simply 
be attached to a mobile object; whereas handheld models 
are, as the name implies, held by an operator. While 
handheld readers may not be able to offer as competitive a 
price as a stationary reader, they offer mobility and 
perhaps more potential applications.  Depending on the 
functions they perform, handheld readers may range from 
$500 to $3,000.16  Unlike stationary readers, handheld 
readers do require manning, but it usually only requires 
one person to operate. 
 
Figure 5.   An example of an RFID system working 
together. 






























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
15 
III. RFID TODAY 
To understand the potential of radio frequency 
identification technology in the future, we need to look no 
further than the applications of today.  Two of the early 
major uses of RFID included garage door openers and animal 
identification, but today’s uses have expanded into many 
different areas, such as automatic toll collection, access 
control, security, equipment tracking and payment, amongst 
others.17  In this chapter we will examine some of the 
current applications of RFID today and some of which are to 
debut in the very near future. 
A. LOGISTICS 
In June of 2003, Wal-Mart announced a mandate that 
would require its top 100 suppliers to equip their 
shipments of merchandise with RFID technology by 2005.  
Wal-Mart is requiring that the suppliers use RFID tags on 
the pallets and individual cases that they ship to the Wal-
Mart distribution center.  This will enable the 
distribution center to instantaneously keep an accurate 
inventory of any tagged item that either enters or exits 
the warehouse.  Ideally, as each Wal-Mart store is being 
equipped with the same readers, they too will have the 
ability to instantly inventory items that are arriving, as 
well as those that are in the store’s warehouse or on the 
sales floor.  The benefits of having a full understanding 
of the stock that is available at any given time will pay 
great dividends.  Since Wal-Mart first introduced this 
mandate, they have broadened their RFID initiative to 
include the next 200 biggest suppliers and they have 
                     17 Simson Garfinkel and Beth Rosenberg, eds.  RFID: Applications, 
Security, and Privacy (Upper Saddle River: Addison Wesley, 2006), 6. 
16 
equipped more than 600 of their Wal-Mart locations with 
RFID readers.  Conveniently, Wal-Mart is in a position of 
power and has not had to pay for the burdens that have been 
placed upon its suppliers.  It was determined that the 
first 137 suppliers that agreed to comply with the mandate 
spent an average of $500,000 to institute the RFID mandate 
within their businesses.  While start up cost has proven to 
be significant, the end results of savings may reach into 
the billions annually.  According to a report by A.T. 
Kearney, these RFID applications could reduce labor costs 
by 7.5 percent and increase labor efficiency by ten to 
twenty percent.  Additionally, “a mere one percent 
reduction in out-of-stock would translate to $2.5 billion 
in added annual sales, since Wal-Mart’s total annual sales 
are about $250 billion.”18 
 
Figure 6.   An example of RFID in supply-chain 
operations. (From: RFID Sourcebook, p. 67) 
 
While Wal-Mart might have been the first large 
business to mandate the implementation of RFID technology 
into its logistics management, it is definitely not alone.  
                     18 Robert Kleist and others, RFID Labeling (Spanish Fork: Banta Book 
Group, 2004), 139. 
17 
One of the world’s largest consumers, the United States 
Department of Defense, followed shortly behind Wal-Mart in 
mandating that all of its 40,000 suppliers also implement 
RFID technology to help track supplies and increase 
efficiency. Naturally, other major companies in the 
civilian sector must compete with one another and any 
advantage that may lead to increased profits will be 
heavily sought after.  Therefore, it is no surprise that 
other retailers, such as Target, Albertsons, Best Buy, and 
European companies Metro AG and Tesco, have joined the 
growing list of companies that are incorporating RFID 
technology in order to efficiently deal with the challenges 
of logistics in big business.19 
B. ELECTRONIC PAYMENT 
Another area of RFID technology application that is 
growing is the use of tags and readers to facilitate 
electronic payment. The basic concept is that when a 
consumer is ready to make a transaction, they simply place 
their tag near the reader.  The tag then provides the 
reader with the customer’s identification information; in 
turn, the reader sends that to a database, which associates 
the information to the individual’s account. Finally, the 
purchaser’s amount will be deducted from his account, all 
of which takes place in an instant.  This application of 
RFID has already been used in large-scale initiatives, such 
as Speedpass and EZ-Pass. 




Figure 7.   Speedpass tag. (From: RFI Sourcebook, p. 81) 
 
Speedpass was created in 1997 by Mobil Oil Corporation 
and has grown to more than 6 million users and more than 
8,900 locations in the United States alone.  The idea is 
that a consumer can pull up to an Exxon or Mobil gas 
station, get fuel or other items from the adjoining 
convenient stores, and then wave a small wand equipped with 
a RFID chip next to a reader located at the gas pump or the 
register inside.  This process simplifies the business 
transaction, avoiding a lengthy payment process and any 
potentially long lines.20 
EZ-Pass is one of the many companies that have 
facilitated the application of electronic toll collection.  
With EZ-Pass, a car is affixed with a tag, usually on the 
windshield, and then as the tag passes by a reader at the 
toll station, it will be identified and accessed the 
appropriate fee. The fee will then be deducted from the 
associated prepaid account automatically.21  
                     20 Sandip Lahiri, RFID Sourcebook.  (Upper Saddle River: IBM Press, 
2006), 81. 
21 Ibid., 82. 
19 
 
Figure 8.   Electronic toll payment. (From: RFID 
Sourcebook, p. 82) 
 
Whether it is avoiding lines at the register or 
traffic jams on the highway, the RFID application of 
electronic payment has proven easy and convenient. 
Additionally, this application eliminates the need to carry 
cash and proves to be more secure than many other forms of 
payment.  Unlike debit cards, these RFID tags do not 
require an actual account number to be printed on the tag 
itself; therefore it has very little value to a potential 
thief.  Even if someone where to steal the tag, most are 
limited as to the amount of money that can be prepaid into 
the account.  It is likely that this application of RFID 
technology will continue to spread to most retailers and 
become very popular with consumers as an option of 
convenience. 
C.  ACCESS CONTROL 
Access control was one of the earliest RFID 
applications as described in chapter II with the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory.  It continues to be a large role for 
RFID today.  Fort McPherson, Georgia has recently begun 
testing its security by employing RFID applications at the 
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post’s gates. More than 5,000 vehicles have been registered 
and equipped with RFID tags in their windshields, which are 
compatible with the readers and database located at each of 
the post’s entrances. When the vehicle approaches the gate 
its signal is received and the gate guard is then shown 
either an acceptance or warning light. If it is accepted, 
the gate will automatically open for that vehicle.  If it 
rejected, the guard can further question the vehicle’s 
occupant using any information that the reader might have 
provided as a means of further verification.  For example, 
the database at Fort McPherson provides the guard a photo 
of the registered vehicle and operators, as well as 
expiration dates for any required certifications or 
inspections, which may also cause an alert if those items 
fall outside the requirements.22 
D. FUTURE APPLICATIONS 
While the government addresses the concerns of privacy 
advocates, a RFID revolution is taking place in both the 
U.S. government and the civilian sector. Starting in 2007, 
anyone applying for a U.S. passport will be issued the new 
e-passport, which contains a RFID tag. Tire makers will be 
placing RFID tags inside of their tires to assist in their 
safety recalls; this will begin with the commercial sector 
and then follow with the individual consumer.  The FDA has 
also suggested that the makers of prescription drugs begin 
to implement RFID technology into their products by 2007, 
while the makers have gone one step further by stating that 
each individual bottle will eventually have a live tag on 
                     22 RFID Knowledgebase, “Fort McPherson Army Base, Vehicle Security” 
Report, IDTechEx, 18 May 2005 [Website]; Available from 
http://rfid.idtechex.com/ 
knowledgebase/en/casestudy.asp?casestudyid=300; Internet; accessed 2 
May 2006. 
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it.  Citibank in New York City is creating a tag that will 
enable commuters to travel conveniently throughout the 
city’s subway system.  While these items have yet to come, 
they are not far beyond our current day applications.  
However, it is anticipated that tags will soon enter the 
home scene.  The industries are already working on tags in 
your clothing that will inform your washing machine to use 
the right settings.  Additionally, there will be tags on 
your individual food items that will let your refrigerator 
know what is missing inside.  In turn, your refrigerator 
will communicate to your cell phone that you need to 
purchase the missing item.23 
While we may have yet to see it, make no mistake, RFID 
is quickly flooding into the markets of the world and it 
has already begun to impact the vast majority of Americans. 
The question is can we apply RFID to other areas where it 
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IV. RFID CONCEPTS FOR AN UNSTABLE ENVIRONMENT  
In the aftermath of 9/11, Larry Ellison, the CEO of 
Oracle, suggested to the United States government that a 
national identification card be established in order to 
prevent any further terror attacks against the United 
States.24  It was recommended that the identification card 
incorporate biometrics and perhaps RFID technology. 
However, to date nothing has materialized, as various civil 
liberties groups have advocated that a national ID card of 
any sort will infringe upon the freedoms of each and every 
U.S. citizen. 
While the conception of a national identification card 
may be postponed, other existing forms of RFID embedded 
identification are in the works, such as the newly arriving 
U.S. passports, as pointed out in Chapter III.  Therefore, 
it may just be a matter of time until this technology does 
enter the mainstream of American security systems and 
identification standards.  While some Americans struggle 
with the implementation of RFID technology, many other 
nations are adopting it and benefiting from its 
capabilities.  Despite America’s resistance toward using 
radio frequency identification with its own citizens, 
perhaps the American people would be more accepting toward 
the use of RFID applications in other places, such as Iraq.  
The purpose of this section is to describe RFID 
concepts that could potentially increase U.S. special 
operations capabilities and the security within an unstable 
                     24 Declan McCullagh, “The Oracle of National ID Cards,” Wired News, 
27 October 2001 [News online]; available from 
http://www.wired.com/news/conflict/0,2100,47788,00.html; Internet; 
accessed 21 April 2006.  
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environment.  For reasons described in Chapter I, Iraq will 
be used when describing the implementation of these RFID 
concepts.  While this section will describe the processes 
of each RFID component in very generic terms, it is very 
important to remember that the RFID community has developed 
a large variety of components with a diverse range of 
capabilities and requirements.  More importantly, as each 
month goes by from the completion of this thesis, the 
technological advances that take place may render some of 
these recommendations outdated based on what is available 
to date.   
A. A NATIONAL ID CARD WITH RFID TECHNOLOGY 
1. The Intent of the National ID Program 
The overall intent of this program is to offer 
instantaneous identity checks on people trafficking areas 
around viable targets.  There are many potential benefits 
that could arise from the use of this technology, which 
will be discussed in the following chapter.  However, it is 
important to point out now that this technology is not just 
a new means by which to identify insurgents, but rather 
this should be viewed as a force multiplier.  It will 
provide more speed and perhaps accuracy in our 
identification methods and increase the number of checks we 
are able to conduct.   
Very rarely are any countermeasures solely able to 
guarantee success against a threat, but when coupled with 
other countermeasures, they may greatly deter and render 
the threat ineffective.  It is the intent of the national 
ID program to challenge the freedom of the insurgent.  In 
order to conduct effective operations, the insurgent 
requires the ability to move freely.  Therefore, creating a 
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less permissive environment for the insurgent by mandating 
a national ID will in essence take away his ability to 
conduct business as usual. 
2. The Mandate 
Once it has been determined that a national 
identification card will be utilized, a mandate must be 
issued to all Iraqi citizens.  To ensure that all of its 
citizens have ample opportunity to acquire the new national 
identification card, a window of time should be created in 
which everyone must obtain the new identification card. For 
example, the mandate could state that all citizens of Iraq 
must obtain the national identification card during the 
month of July; anyone that has not attained this 
identification after July 31st is liable of non-compliance 
of a government mandate.  
3. Emplacing the Stationary Readers 
After the population has been issued the new national 
identification card with the embedded RFID chip, it is then 
time to emplace the readers.  The readers should be placed 
in any area that is considered a high value target. For 
example, if an insurgent group’s objective is to overthrow 
a government, then they will likely attempt to undermine 
that government’s legitimacy.  One way to accomplish this 
could be by targeting security forces, whether it is police 
or military, in hopes that it would show their inability to 
defend against the threat and possibly decrease their 
future capabilities.  Therefore, to counter these potential 
attacks, readers could be positioned at all access points 
around police stations or military bases.  Other likely 
targets may include airports, high traffic shopping areas, 
stadiums, water plants, and energy facilities, to name a 
few.  Among other things, these stationary readers may 
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offer great benefits through a reduction in manpower.  
Ideally, multiple locations would be covered by one central   
monitoring station, which could conceivably be monitored by 
one person.     
 
 
Figure 9.   RFID identification card with reader. 
 
4. The Mobile Readers 
Often during times of instability, many countries will 
institute a program to establish random checkpoints in 
order to reduce the freedom of maneuver for the insurgents.  
These checkpoints could be established on either a roadway 
for vehicle access or in popular pedestrian areas, where 
chokepoints could be easily established with simple 
barriers.  As mentioned in chapter II, these mobile readers 
require very little in terms of resources. A checkpoint 
could consist of just one person using a handheld reader or 
a fixed reader mounted on a patrolling police car. 
5. The Penalty for Non-Compliance 
After the cards have been issued and the readers are 
in place, then it is time to enact the RFID system.  
Basically when a person walks by a reader with his RFID 
READER  
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embedded identification card, then the reader will receive 
the signal and recognize the person’s identity. At that 
point, either the person will be allowed to pass, or a 
signal will be sent out to the authorities if the person is 
on a watch list.  However, if a person walks by a reader 
and no signal is received, then the reader will also send 
out a signal notifying the authorities that a person has 
passed by without identification.  The ability to detect 
those without identification cards can be made possible 
with a combination of motion detectors and video 
surveillance.  In the event that a citizen is in violation 
of the mandate, he will be detained immediately.  
Initially, an interrogation should take place on the 
detained citizen in order to seek an explanation of his 
non-compliance.  If it is found that the individual had a 
justifiable reason for not obtaining a national ID and he 
is not in violation of any other laws, then he should be 
issued the identification card and immediately released.  
However, if it is determined that he intentionally avoided 
the issuance of the national identification card, then he 
should be further detained as a penalty.  Potentially, some 
citizens might not want to adhere to the mandate, possibly 
for reasons of previous criminal activity or terror related 
activity.  Clearly those falling into that category would 
remain in detention and then processed through the criminal 
justice system.  While there may never be complete 
adherence to the mandate, it is most likely that an 
overwhelming majority would comply in order to carry on 
their livelihood and avoid potential imprisonment. On the 
other hand, those that oppose it, potentially insurgents, 
would be forced underground in order to avoid detection and 
carry on without government intervention. 
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B. RFID EMBEDDED VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION TAGS 
Placing Radio Frequency Identification tags on 
vehicles is by no means a new idea, as pointed out in 
chapter III by the multiple applications of RFID already in 
use.  In fact, the system which is described in this 
section nearly mirrors a system currently being tested in 
the United Kingdom.25 
1. The Intent of the Vehicle Identification Tags 
The intent of the RFID embedded vehicle tags is to 
deter insurgent movement and degrade their ability to use 
vehicles as weapons.  This technology will enable military 
and law enforcement officials to instantaneously discover 
to whom the vehicle is registered.  Clearly, if the owner 
is on a watch list of any sort, he can be detained at that 
time and his car impounded.  However, it might be wiser to 
assume that most insurgents will not risk getting their 
vehicles registered for fear of getting caught at the time 
of registration.  While this avoidance may seem an easy way 
out for the insurgent, it is actually still beneficial to 
the imposing government; it would either keep the 
insurgent’s vehicles out of operation or force them to take 
a chance in driving without the proper identification tags, 
with a high risk of apprehension. 
2. The Mandate and the Enforcement 
Similar to the mandate for the national identification 
card, a deadline should be determined by which every Iraqi 
citizen should be required to register their vehicle and 
have the new vehicle identification tag properly displayed 
on their vehicle.  
                     25 Identec Solutions, “RFID-enabled License Plates to Identify UK 
Vehicles,” RFID News, 10 June 2004 [News online] available from 
http://rfidnews.org/news/ 2004/06/10.rfidenabled-license-plates-to-
identify-uk-vehicles/; Internet; accessed 5 April 2006. 
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After that deadline has passed, a strict enforcement 
of the mandate must follow.  Vehicles that are not 
registered should be immediately impounded.  If it is 
concluded that the owner was justifiably unable to get the 
vehicle registered, then he should be given the opportunity 
to register it on the spot and be released.  However, if it 
is determined that the owner was a member of an insurgent 
group or that his vehicle was scheduled to be used in an 
upcoming attack, then the person would be held for trial 
and the vehicle impounded or destroyed.  
3. The Vehicle Gates 
In time, it is possible that every roadway and 
intersection could be fixed with a stationary reader.  
However, for this concept, it will be treated as though the 
number of readers is limited.  Therefore, the most likely 
targets must be determined as was recommended in the 
previous section.  The significant difference this time is 
not placing the readers immediately adjacent to the likely 
targets, but rather creating a substantial buffer.  This 
must be done to potentially counter the increased threat of 
a vehicle in comparison to a single person, as discussed in 
the previous section.  In other words, a vehicle can hold a 
much greater amount of explosives and therefore may not 
require being placed in the target area like a person.  A 
vehicle could be placed adjacent to the target area, such 
as the case in the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995; therefore 
it is critical that the readers are placed far enough away 
from the likely targets to prevent potential damage and 
give military or police forces the adequate time to respond 
to a threat.  Another key aspect in the placement of the 
stationary readers is placing them in a pattern which will 
enable those monitoring the system the ability to determine 
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the direction of travel of the suspected insurgent vehicle.  
This can be easily accomplished in two ways, by tracking 
the hits from multiple readers or supplementing the readers 
with a video monitoring system. 
 
 
Figure 10.   RFID vehicle tag with reader. 
 
4. The Mobile Reader 
As noted in the national identification card 
recommendation, it is common that an unstable country would 
set up random checkpoints in hopes to deter insurgent 
movement.  Naturally, these checkpoints would be interested 
in vehicular identification as well as personal 
identification.  Similar to the stationary readers, the 
placement of these random checkpoints should also take 
standoff from the potential targets into consideration.  
Unlike the stationary reader, the mobile reader may require 
at least one man to operate, unless the risk was taken to 
leave a mobile reader unattended.  If in fact a mobile 
reader was being operated by someone, then additional 
safety measures would have to be implemented.  Unlike the 
personnel checkpoint, vehicles provide many options to 
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31 
conceal weapons or explosives that may be of harm to the 
reader’s operator.  In a worse case scenario, it could be 
assumed that an insurgent might use these instruments of 
harm once the operator learned the identity of the vehicle.  
As a result to counter the potential harm that the 
insurgent may inflict, it might be necessary to create a 
mobile protective barrier from which the operator can still 
perform his task.  Additionally, it might be advantageous 
to provide the operator with additional armed personnel to 
watch over his position. 
5. Conclusion  
While at first glance each of these recommendations 
may seem to have weaknesses, it is important to understand 
that the idea is to run these two applications 
simultaneously and in coordination with one another.  
Naturally one might assume that with respect to the vehicle 
identification tag recommendation, the insurgent could just 
bypass the issue by stealing another person’s vehicle.  
This in essence could work if the RFID embedded tags were 
an independent program, but if it is intertwined with the 
RFID embedded national identification card, it will be less 
likely to work.  For example, when a vehicle passes a 
reader, it will receive the signal from the vehicle and at 
the same time it will also receive a signal from the 
occupant’s national identification cards.  If these two 
signals match, then the vehicle may simply proceed, but if 
the reader detects any discrepancies, then an alarm will be 
triggered.  This example demonstrates the fundamental 
necessity of having both these initiatives working in 
conjunction with one another and the potential results they 
may provide against the insurgent population.  Of course 
there are other potential downfalls that the insurgent will 
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try to take advantage of, but the overall benefits may 
greatly outweigh the weaknesses.  The next chapter will 





V. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF RFID 
TECHNOLOGIES 
The United States has struggled in its rebuilding 
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and it has been forced to 
evolve in how it contends with its enemies.  The enemy has 
adapted to face the conventional successes of the United 
States Armed Forces.  They have done so by exploiting areas 
with which we are unequipped to fight back, such as 
improvised explosive devices, suicide car bombs, and 
kidnappings.  For the most part, the United States was 
unprepared to deal with these sorts of issues.  While some 
gains have been made, not enough has been done.  The United 
States must explore the advantages of upcoming technologies 
and determine whether or not these can help us in the 
Global War on Terror.  It is the intent of this chapter to 




The United States Armed Forces along with the Iraqi 
population have endured great human losses since the 
liberation of Iraq from Sadam Hussein.  More than 2100 U.S. 
service men and women have been killed as a result of 
hostile fire since March 2003 and Iraqi civilian casualties 
totaled more than 9600 for the year of 2005.26  One of the 
largest contributing factors to these deaths is attacks 
involving the use of a vehicle by the insurgents to inflict 
casualties upon the Iraqi and U.S. populations.  These 
attacks include car bombings, suicide car bombings, and use 
of a vehicle to run down its victims.  To date the United                      26 White, Iraqi Casualties.  
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States and Iraqi governments have been unable to 
effectively combat these attacks involving vehicles.  
Consequently, there is no sense of security in Iraq today.  
In fact, recent polls have shown that the Iraqi people view 
the security in Iraq to be on the decline. 
 
 
Table 1. Iraqi population poll from March 23-31, 2006. 
(From: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, p. 42) 
 
If Radio Frequency Identification proves to be 
effective in deterring and preventing car related attacks 
or helps in the apprehension of known insurgents, it may 
increase the security in Iraq. This is perhaps the greatest 
advantage that RFID can create and it is the antithesis of 
what the insurgent hopes to accomplish. If the government 
can not provide a secure environment for its citizens, then 
the people may lose faith in them. This may cause the 
citizens to convert their trust toward the insurgents, who 
may appear to have control of the situation. 
2. Crime Solving  
Security is certainly affected by that which we can 
deter and prevent, but it can also be increased by solving 
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crimes after they have taken place and holding those 
responsible accountable for their acts.  This is one other 
area where RFID can play a large role.  Even in the 
aftermath of an attack, the RFID signals that were 
collected prior to the event can provide us clues about the 
incident and enable us to identify the perpetrators much 
quicker than using conventional means.  Assuming that RFID 
readers are effective in stopping movement of personnel 
without the national identification cards and unregistered 
vehicles, we can conclude that a vehicle and its driver 
reaching a high value target would have had to obtain both 
a proper identification card and vehicle tag.  While these 
initiatives may have failed in identifying a potential 
attacker, they would have recorded the identity information 
about the vehicle and the driver prior to the attack.  
Rather than having to sift through the aftermath of the car 
bomb to find clues, investigators can simply retrieve the 
data recorded by all the readers leading into the area of 
the attack.  This potentially large list of vehicles and 
occupants can be quickly narrowed down by canceling out all 
those vehicles and drivers that registered a second 
outgoing signal when leaving the target area.  This action 
alone would reduce the list of potential suspects down to 
those individuals and their vehicles that are still in the 
target area.  If the attack was not a suicide bomb and the 
perpetrator attempted to flea the area after the attack, an 
alarm would be triggered as the individual passes by a 
reader without the corresponding vehicle he entered the 
area with.  If any attack occurs, either law enforcement or 
military personnel should immediately position themselves 
outside of the surrounding readers, enabling them to 
apprehend the suspect once he has triggered the reader to 
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report an inconsistency.  In time all of the vehicles 
within the area of attack will be cleared by either having 
passed back through a reader or being positively identified 
within the area of attack by investigating officials.  
Using this technique the end result will be the 
undisputable identity of the vehicle and its driver. 
This process could certainly be made more rapid if a 
controlled evacuation of the area were to take place as 
officials filter each vehicle and person within the attack 
area out of the vicinity and past a reader.  In theory, 
this process could take place very quickly.  If the 
identities of the vehicle and driver were obtained, then 
the driver, if captured alive, could be detained and 
further questioned.  However, if he were killed due to the 
attack, investigators still have the identity with which 
they can begin an immediate investigation. 
This is a huge advantage over conventional 
investigative techniques, which would require much 
lengthier methods in identification even if the body were 
not disfigured from the attack.  However, with the 
perpetrator’s signal having been recorded by a reader, an 
investigator can immediately look at the national database 
and determine the suspect’s home address and relations.  
With this information at hand, authorities can immediately 
begin a search at the perpetrator’s residence and begin 
questioning his family and friends.  This investigative 
work may lead to other helpful information, such as his 
associates and suppliers, and potentially help unravel some 




3. Economic Gain 
If Radio Frequency Identification can bring a greater 
sense of security to an unstable environment, then economic 
growth may follow.  Basilan, a small island in the southern 
province of the Philippines, was plagued by a terrorist 
organization known as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).  For 
years the ASG terrorized the inhabitants by committing many 
heinous acts, such as murder, kidnapping, extortion, and 
bombings.  These actions were also aimed at businesses to 
undermine the potential economic growth on the island and 
in effect make the government look incompetent.  These acts 
were very effective at forcing businesses to close and 
keeping outside investors away from the island.  However, 
when U.S. military intervention took place in 2002, the Abu 
Sayyaf Group quickly found itself on the run and losing 
their control over the island’s population.   As time went 
on, many members of the organization were either captured 
or killed, and most of the remaining members sought refuge 
in other areas off the island.  As a result, the feeling of 
security greatly increased and the island’s inhabitants 
felt free to carry on their once regular routines.  
Additionally, businesses reopened and outside investors 
sought new opportunities as they brought the island’s first 
franchise restaurant, Jolly Bee.  The potential for 
economic growth was unleashed as a result of increased 
security.  This correlation between security and economic 
growth is by no means unique in Basilan; it is common 
practice for big businesses to look for areas with 
stability to ensure their own long term success.   
4. Less Intrusive and Time Consuming 
Security check points in any setting can bring about 
negative feelings for those who are subject to them.  Check 
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points may consume any sense of freedom a person could 
have; of course that feeling would be even greater if those 
manning the checkpoints are personnel from an occupying 
force rather than members of the host nation.  
Additionally, they also cause a great inconvenience for 
people in terms of time.  Pedestrian check points can be 
equally as inconvenient and are reminiscent of the secret 
police of the former East Germany, the Stasi, or the French 
in Algiers.  Recent polls taken in Iraq have indicated that 
65% of the citizens are opposed to the presence of American 
forces.27  Clearly, the eventual withdrawal of American 
forces will satisfy many citizens in Iraq, but reality is 
that it will probably take a long period of time.  
Therefore, in the meantime, the United States should take 
every measure possible to reduce the signature of U.S. 
forces.  Additionally, it should be the aim of the Iraqi 
forces to do the same in due time.  While it is probably 
unlikely that a value can be placed on the citizen’s 
satisfaction, it is likely that lessening the physical 
presence of troops or police, while maintaining security 
could be well received.  In this particular aspect, radio 
frequency identification has a great amount of potential 
toward improving public opinion.  RFID applications can 
help reduce the physical signature of military and police 
presence throughout any given environment.  One stationary 
reader could potentially replace a conventional five-person 
check point and still provide the same security.  
Additionally, the RFID portals, either permanent or mobile, 
will enable both pedestrian and vehicular traffic to flow 
                     27 Anonymous, “What Do the Iraqis Really Want,” Time, 19 December 
2005 [magazine online]; available from http://libproxy.nps.navy.mil/ 
login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=942822331&sid=1&Fmt=3&clie
ntId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 16 May 2006. 
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at full capacity.  This reduction in physical signature and 
time consumption will modify the current security apparatus 
into a less intrusive mechanism, which in turn may lessen 
the tensions that exist today.    
5. Possible Reduction in Casualties 
As stated in the last section, converting the current 
conventional security check points into RFID enhanced check 
point will greatly reduce the personnel requirements.  As a 
result this will not only decrease the physical presence at 
these sites, but it will also reduce the number of 
potential targets for an insurgent.  Attacks upon check 
points are not uncommon in Iraq today, but if we were to 
significantly reduce the numbers of personnel on these 
sites, we could potentially save more lives while still 
accomplishing the same results of the conventional check 
points.   
Another problem today is that the personnel manning 
check points must remain at a high level of alertness 
throughout their time at the checkpoint.  Currently, there 
is no way to distinguish between a well-intentioned citizen 
and an insurgent that is preparing to conduct an attack.  
Therefore, personnel at these check points must treat every 
person as a potential insurgent that is willing to take his 
life at any given moment.  For this fact alone, it needless 
to say that the job related stress is extremely high.  As a 
result, the people manning the checkpoints may be more 
prone to take offensive action if they feel as though their 
lives are threatened.  Unfortunately, this may result in 
the deaths of innocent personnel, as was the case in 
Baghdad in March of 2005, when an Italian intelligence 
officer was killed and an Italian journalist was wounded 
40 
after violating U.S. checkpoints procedures.28  In 
circumstances such as this, a RFID reader would eliminate 
the need for approaching vehicles to comply with any 
procedures, for they need only to drive past the reader.  
More importantly, the RFID reader will eliminate the need 
for personnel to distinguish between a suspect insurgent 
and a law-abiding citizen. Instead, the reader will 
identify the suspect vehicle and alert officials further 
down the road of the suspicious vehicle and driver.  At 
this point, law enforcement or military personnel have 
gained the advantage of knowing the identity of the suspect 
and his vehicle and can react to them accordingly.  
Additionally, those officials can choose their location of 
apprehension of the suspect, potentially minimizing any 
chances of collateral damage.   
6. Relatively Low-Cost 
As with any new system of this magnitude, the startup 
cost could be high, but the cost to maintain the system 
would be significantly less.  Without actually going 
through the acquisition process, a highly accurate estimate 
is virtually unattainable, but to better understand the 
relative cost, I have roughly estimated the cost to 
implement the two RFID applications using approximate costs 
given by various sources.  Assuming that both the national 
identification cards and the vehicle identification tags 
can use the same readers, I have calculated an estimated 
cost for 10,000 fixed readers at a price of $1,500 each and 
1,000 handheld readers at the high end cost of $3,000 
                     28 Annia Ciezadlo, “What Iraq’s Checkpoints are Like,” Christian 
Science Monitor, 7 March 2005, [newspaper online]; available from 
http://www.csmonitorservices.com/csmonitor/display.jhtml;jsessionid=GFY
LGQMKVOYPPKGL4L2SFEQ?_requestid=83778; Internet; accessed 5 March 2006. 
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each.29  For national identification cards, I have rounded 
up the current population of Iraq to 28 million people and 
estimated the price of each card to $50, the high end cost 
of an active tag today.30  In regards to the vehicle 
identification tags, I have used a figure of 20 million 
vehicles and estimated the price of $100 per vehicle tag.  
The infrastructure buildup, establishment of a database and 
maintenance cost are the most difficult to determine, but 
for this process I have estimated one billion dollars for 
the first five years of expenses.   
 
unit price units needed total cost
Fixed Reader $1,500 10000 15,000,000$       
Handheld Reader $3,000 1000 3,000,000$         
National ID Cards $50 28,000,000 1,400,000,000$  
Vehicle Tags $100 20,000,000 2,000,000,000$  
Start-up/Maintenance $1,000,000,000 1 1,000,000,000$  
Total = 4,418,000,000$  
Table 2. An estimated cost for both RFID applications. 
 
While these costs are staggering at first glance, 
these figures must be compared to the current cost of the 
war in Iraq today. From the beginning of the war in Iraq 
until September 2005, more than 197 billion dollars have 
been appropriated to cover the war, which is an average of 
79 billion a year.31  While the estimated five-year cost is 
significantly less than the current annual budget, it is 
still a hefty price to pay for uncertain results.  
Therefore, a trial basis may be better suited for 
implementation in Iraq.  For example, these applications 
could be exclusively instituted in the three most violent 
                     29 Adrian Hawley, “RE: E-plates” Email to author, 11 April 2006.  
30 “RFID System Components and Costs,” 1. 
31 Andrew Krepinevich, “The War in Iraq,” (Washington, D.C: Center 
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,2005), 103. 
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provinces in Iraq.  Then after a one-year trial, the 
results could be examined, and the decision to expand or 
stop the RFID programs could be made.  
7. Operations, Maintenance, and Training 
While the manufacturing and initial setup of each 
component must be handled by private contractors, the 
operational and maintenance aspects will require much less 
specialized attention.  It is quite reasonable to assume 
that any soldier could operate a handheld reader with 
relatively little training, similar to that of a grocery 
store employee conducting an inventory with a conventional 
handheld scanner.  Basically the reader itself will 
automatically acquire the signal from the tag. All that is 
required of the operator is to read the monitor and make an 
assessment from the information given by the database.   
8. Instantaneous Tracking 
While the intention of this paper is to remain neutral 
in aspects of individual privacy, it is important to point 
out all of the potential uses of Radio Frequency 
Identification.  In the event that an individual was put on 
a terrorist watch list, the government could easily use the 
existing RFID system to monitor the individual’s movement.  
While this could be of great use to both military and law 
enforcement officials, this is also one of the major points 
of contention with opponents to RFID technology, as 
described in the later portion of this chapter.   
9. Coupling RFID with Other Technologies 
While RFID by itself may prove to be an effective tool 
in deterring insurgent activity, its potential may be even 
greater when matched with other technologies.  For example, 
a RFID reader interrogating vehicle tags paired with a 
video camera could provide much more additional 
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information.  First of all, the video captured could be 
used to match up the physical description of the vehicle to 
a vehicle photo that may have been put into a database at 
the time of registration.  Even more beneficial would be 
the current identifying information, such as the number of 
occupants in the vehicle or any objects affixed to the 
vehicle that might not have previously been there.  These 
description updates could be quickly broadcast to anyone 
involved in the apprehension of the vehicle and greatly 
increase their likelihood of success in finding the 
vehicle.   
B. DISADVANTAGES 
Throughout history, societies have established 
security measures, such as keys and identification cards, 
in order to prevent crimes from being committed.  Despite 
these efforts to thwart crime, the criminal has been 
equally as persistent at developing counter measures to 
outwit these devices.  The intent of this section is to 
address the potential threats against RFID technology, some 
of which have already been considered by the industry, and 
point out the areas that may still be a threat of 
exploitation. 
1. Identity Theft 
Just as ordinary identification cards are commonly 
stolen in order for a person to assume another’s identity, 
what can be done to prevent the same type of occurrence 
with an RFID tag? Companies like Hills Numberplates Ltd., 
the maker of E-Plate, have already addressed this issue. E-
Plate is a vehicle license tag that has an embedded RFID 
chip within it.  If the license plate is tampered with, the 
chip will automatically self-destruct, thus killing the 
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signal it would otherwise broadcast to a RFID reader.32  
When the vehicle drives past a reader without a signal, an 
alarm would go off alerting officials to apprehend the 
vehicle.  At that point, the enforcement officials could 
inspect the plate and make an assessment. 
Unlike the vehicle tags, it may be more difficult to 
prevent identity theft with national identification cards 
because there is no need to remove a RFID tag, as it is  
self-contained in one highly mobile card.  Therefore, there 
is a great likelihood that someone could obtain a 
functioning identification card from another person in 
order to circumvent existing security measures.  For that 
reason, it is critical that information, such as a photo, 
be embedded within the tag’s data in order to authenticate 
the card holder’s identity.  Additionally, facial 
recognition programs intertwined with the RFID applications 
could greatly enhance the probability of catching those who 
seek to beat the system. 
2. Counterfeiting RFID 
If an insurgent can’t acquire an original RFID tag due 
to anti-theft measures, then why can’t they manufacture 
one?  That is exactly what one research team from John 
Hopkins University did as part of a study.  A member of the 
team carrying a backpack, which concealed his equipment, 
walked past a test subject that was carrying the popular 
Speedpass from Exxon Mobil.  As he passed by, the equipment 
that he was carrying was able to break the encryption and 
download the vital information from the Speedpass.  At that 
point, the team drove to a Speedpass participating gas 
                     32 e-Plate – a World of RFID Solutions, “e-Plate Operation Overview,” 
E-plate, 25 November 2005 [digital brochure]; available as e-Plate 
Operation Overview.pdf; e-mail; accessed 11 April 2006. 
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station and, using a computer, replicated the signal 
broadcasted by the original Speedpass, enabling them to 
charge gas to the actual holder’s account.33  With a 
plethora of RFID manufacturing companies and products, such 
as a relatively inexpensive printer which is capable of 
printing an RFID tag with a home computer, it would seem 
rather easy to produce a tag that could penetrate the 
system.   
However, this is not the case if the RFID systems 
specifications are properly safeguarded.  It is important 
to point out that the aforementioned study was conducted in 
2005 on the Speedpass system which was created in 1997.34  
Notably, it took eight years to crack the code on a first 
generation technology that is considered by most in the 
industry to be primitive.  There are many different aspects 
of each tag that would have to be precisely the same in 
order for it to properly communicate with a reader, such as 
the correct frequency and adequate range. Even if a person 
were able to produce a tag capable of communicating with a 
reader, then they would have to get it to transmit the 
right information.  This would involve knowing valid 
identity codes and passwords, all of which would require 
inside help. Additionally, that information would have to 
be placed both on the tag and in the database, which would 
once again require help from within the confines of the 
RFID system.  While potentially difficult to accomplish, we 
cannot rule out the possibility of an insurgent acquiring 
an insider’s assistance, but as with any conventional  
 
                     33 Tiernan, 38.  
34 Garfinkel and Rosenberg, 179. 
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security measure, procedures along with checks and balances 
must be implemented in order to prevent these types of acts 
from taking place. 
3. The Intrusion into Privacy 
Tracking, one of RFID’s greatest capabilities, is also 
perhaps one of its greatest weaknesses.  In recent times an 
individual’s right to privacy has headlined the national 
news in such incidences like the national wire tapping 
program run by the National Security Agency.  Opponents to 
RFID technology argue that this technology has the 
potential to turn any society into that which was described 
as “Big Brother” in George Orwell’s 1984.  Simply put, 
there is a fear amongst many citizens that those in control 
of RFID technologies can monitor anyone, at anytime.  Mark 
Rasch, a former head of the computer-crime unit for the 
U.S. Justice Department, says that “RFID is the electronic 
equivalent of allowing everyone to snoop through your 
medicine cabinet.”35 
While it is not plausible to deny that this kind of 
misuse with RFID applications can occur, it necessary to 
remember that any form of surveillance needs to be properly 
managed to ensure that checks and balances, such as 
standard operating procedures and frequent inspections are 
in place to avoid such abuses.  Radio frequency 
identification applications are no different than 
surveillance or wire tapping, and if left unmanaged they 
can and probably will be used improperly.   
                     35 Tiernan, 34. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The RFID train is beginning to leave the station… 
There is no downside to a public dialogue about 
these issues, but there are many dangers in 
waiting too long to start.36  
 - U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy  
While it is never too late to begin implementation of 
radio frequency identification applications, there are 
potential dangers in waiting longer.  Dozens of members 
from the United States armed forces, foreign military, 
policeman, and nationals are dying on a daily basis, 
because of an inability to provide security in places like 
Iraq and Afghanistan.   
Throughout history, many nations have had to deal with 
civil disobedience in various forms, ranging from refusal 
to pay taxes to today’s frequent suicide bombings.  While 
the first offense may be easier to deal with, the 
principles to deter both may be similar.  When the British 
were experiencing problems with some of the Chinese 
population in Malaya during the 1950s, part of their 
solution was to issue identification cards to those they 
deemed as a risk to national stability.37  Another 
historical example of dealing with civil disobedience was 
the East German government following World War II.  In 
order to cope with any potential civil disobedience, the 
government formed the Stasi, a national secret police 
division, which kept close tabs on its citizens through 
                     36 Tiernan, 39. 
37 Frank Pelli, “Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Marines in 
Vietnam,” 1990 [Ohio State University online]; available from 
http://ehistory.osu.edu/vietnam/essays/insurgency/index.cfm; Internet; 
accessed 15 March 2006. 
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intensive surveillance.38  Whether it involved the 
requirement for a national identification card or heavy 
observation of citizen activity, each countermeasure boiled 
down to accountability through a means of inventory.  From 
this perspective we can compare a government providing 
security for its citizens to a store manager that sells a 
perishable product.  In order to run a successful business, 
a manager must maintain an accurate inventory of its 
products and keep a careful watch on the expiration dates 
of those items.  Both of these aspects are vital to the 
success of the business.  If the store manager fails to 
keep an accurate count of his product, he runs the risk of 
running out of that product and having nothing to offer the 
consumer. Likewise, if the manager overlooks the expiration 
dates on his products, he may be forced to discard his 
inventory and forfeit his profit.  Failure to conduct 
inventories or maintain a careful watch over a perishable 
product can result in a business failure.  In order to 
understand this comparison we can substitute the store 
manager with a nation’s government, and the product with 
the citizens of that nation.  In this situation the 
government must also keep an inventory of its citizens 
through various methods such as a census, a national 
database, a national identification card, or perhaps a 
combination of these.  A nation’s failure to maintain 
accountability of its citizens could result in the 
inability to provide for them and the possibility of being 
unable to determine the identity of those who are a risk to 
that nation’s security.  Similar to the previous example, a 
government must also keep watch on its citizens, for they 
too can go bad like a perishable item.  If left unchecked,                      38 John Koehler, Stasi (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 9. 
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a citizen or a group of citizens can develop a movement 
with the intent to threaten a nation’s security or 
undermine the government itself.  Maintaining the same 
point of reference, can we use RFID to help assist a 
foreign nation or the U.S. armed forces in maintaining 
security through an inventory-minded approach? If one can 
conceptualize the inventory approach, it is an easy step to 
understanding how RFID technology can provide an advantage 
to those trying to maintain order.  As pointed out in 
Chapter III, RFID has revolutionized the business world by 
increasing overall efficiency and reducing human 
intervention. These same benefits could be applied to areas 
of instability by providing our armed forces valuable real-
time information about the public at large.  Instituting 
the RFID applications recommended in Chapter IV could 
produce the same positive results for the Department of 
Defense, which RFID has delivered in the civilian business 
sector.  
Despite the numerous advantages that these RFID 
concepts could provide, the greatest challenge might be 
convincing the populations where these are to be 
implemented that there are great benefits to be gained in 
exchange for minor modifications in their daily lives.  
Similar initiatives, such as the Real ID Act and RFID 
embedded passports, have faced large opposition in the 
United States and continue to face the threat of being 
brought to a halt.  Certainly some will protest that RFID 
will impose upon their personal freedoms, but in actuality, 
it would not if it is responsibly managed.  Some resistance 
to RFID technology is good, in that it requires 
manufacturers to incorporate the opponent’s concerns into 
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their applications and alerts governments to potential 
weaknesses in RFID products.  While citizens may be 
monitored more than before, they can continue to conduct 
themselves in the same manner that they have been.  Only 
those that partake in illegal and potentially harmful acts 
should pay a price as law enforcement may gain the upper 
hand through the increased technology.  However, the 
potential benefits of increased national security may 
greatly outweigh any negative aspects associated with the 
RFID concepts recommended within this thesis. Australia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom, amongst others, are 
already implementing similar RFID related security 
measures, and it is potentially a short matter of time 
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51 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
“Glossary of RFID Terms,” RFID Journal [journal online]; 
available from http://www.rfidjournal.com 
/article/articleview/1338/1/129; Internet; accessed 21 
April 2006. 
“Introduction to RFID,” Identec Solutions. Available from 
http://www.identecsolutions.com/ intro_to_rfid.asp; 
Internet; accessed 3 May 2006. 
“RFID System Components and Costs,” RFID Journal [journal 
online]; available from http://www.rfidjournal.com 
/article/articleview/1338/1/129; Internet; accessed 21 
April 2006. 
“The History of RFID Technology,” RFID Journal [journal 
online]; available from http://www.rfidjournal.com 
/article/articleview/1338/1/129; Internet; accessed 21 
April 2006.  
Albrecht, Katherine, and Liz McIntyre.  Spychips.  
Nashville: Nelson Current, 2005. 
Anonymous, “What Do the Iraqis Really Want,” Time, 19 
December 2005 [magazine online]; available from 
http://libproxy.nps.navy.mil/login?url=http://proquest
.umi.com/pqdweb?did=942822331&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientId=119
69&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 16 May 2006. 
Bandow, Doug, James Bovard, Richard Ebeling, Jacob 
Hornberger, and Sheldon Richman.  Liberty, Security, 
and the War on Terrorism.  Fairfax: The Future of 
Freedom Foundation, 2003. 
Bayley, David.  Forces of Order: Police Behavior in Japan 
and the United States.  Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1976. 
Childs, David.  The Stasi: The East German Intelligence and 
Security Service.  New York: New York University 
Press, 1996. 
52 
Ciezadlo, Annia. “What Iraq’s Checkpoints are Like,” 
Christian Science Monitor, 7 March 2005, [newspaper 
online]; available from http://www.csmonitorservices. 
com/csmonitor/display.jhtml;jsessionid=GFYLGQMKVOYPPKG
L4L2SFEQ?_requestid=83778; Internet; accessed 5 March 
2006. 
Currer-Briggs, Noel, ed.  Security: Attitudes and 
Techniques for Management.  London: Hutchinson & Co., 
1968. 
Department of Defense. “Daily Casualty Report.” 1 June 
2006. Website. Available from http://www.defenselink. 
mil/news/casualty.pdf; Internet; accessed 1 June 2006 
e-Plate – a World of RFID Solutions, “e-Plate Operation 
Overview,” E-plate, 25 November 2005 [digital 
brochure]; available as e-Plate Operation 
Overview.pdf; e-mail; accessed 11 April 2006. 
Field, Stewart, and Caroline Pelser, eds.  Invading the 
Private: State Accountability and New Investigative 
Methods in Europe.  Brookfield: Ashgate Publishing 
Company, 1998. 
Flynn, Stephen.  America the Vulnerable: How Our Government 
is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism.  New York: 
Harper Collins Publishers Inc., 2004. 
Garfinkel, Simson, and Beth Rosenberg, eds.  RFID: 
Applications, Security, and Privacy.  Upper Saddle 
River: Addison Wesley, 2006. 
Hawley, Adrian. “RE: E-plates.” Email to author, 11 April 
2006.  
Heyman, Philip.  Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning 
without War.  Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003. 
Identec Solutions. “RFID-enabled license Plates to Identify 
UK Vehicles.” RFID News, 10 June 2004. News online. 
Available from http://rfidnews.org/news/ 
2004/06/10.rfidenabled-license-plates-to-identify-uk-
vehicles/; Internet; accessed 5 April 2006. 
Kleist, Robert, Theodore Chapman, David Sakai, and Brad 
Jarvis. RFID Labeling. Spanish Fork: Banta Book Group, 
2004. 
53 
Koehler, John.  Stasi.  Boulder: Westview Press, 1999. 
Krepinevich, Andrew. “The War in Iraq: An Interim 
Assessment.” Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments, 2005. 
Lahiri, Sandip.  RFID Sourcebook.  Upper Saddle River: IBM 
Press, 2006.  
Landt, Jeremy. “Shrouds of Time: The History of RFID”, AIM 
{whitepaper online]; available from 
http://www.aimglobal.org/technologies/rfid/ 
resources/shrouds_of_time.pdf; Internet; accessed 26 
April 2006. 
Leites, Nathan and Charles Wolf. Rebellion and Authority: 
An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts. Chicago: 
Markham Publishing Company, 1970. 
Libiki, Martin.  “Are RFIDs Coming to Get You?”  IEEE 
Security & Privacy, Vol. 3, Num. 6 (2005): 6. 
Mahajan, Rahul.  The New Crusade: America’s War on 
Terrorism.  New York: Monthly Review Press, 2002. 
McCullagh, Declan. “The Oracle of National ID Cards.” Wired 
News, 27 October 2001. News online. Available from 
http://www.wired.com/news/conflict/0,2100,47788,00.htm
l; Internet; accessed 21 April 2006.  
National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C: 2006), 
Preface. 
O’Hanlon, Michael, Peter Orszag, Ivo Daalader, I. Destler, 
David Gunter, James Lindsay, Robert Litan, and James 
Steinberg.  Protecting the American Homeland: One Year 
On.  Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution Press, 
2002. 
Pelli, Frank. “Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the 
Marines in Vietnam.” Global Security, 1990. Report 
online; Available from http://www.globalsecurity. 
org/military/library/report/1990/PFD.htm; Internet; 
accessed 8 June 2006. 
Phillips, Ted, Tom Karygiannis, and Rick Kuhn.  “Security 
Standards for the RFID Market.”  IEEE Security & 
Privacy, Vol. 3, Num. 6 (2005): 85-89.  
54 
Reuters, “U.S. Retired Generals Debate over Rumsfeld,” 
MSNBC 16 April 2006 [website]; available from 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ default.aspx?id=9974867; 
accessed 21 April 2006. 
RFID Knowledgebase. “Fort McPherson Army Base, Vehicle 
Security” Report, IDTechEx, 18 May 2005. Website. 
Available from http://rfid.idtechex.com/ 
knowledgebase/en/casestudy.asp?casestudyid=300; 
Internet; accessed 2 May 2006. 
Shepard, Steven.  RFID: Radio Frequency Identification.  
New York: McGraw Hill, 2005.  
Sweeny, Patrick. RFID for Dummies. Hoboken: Wiley 
Publishing, Inc., 2005. 
Tiernan, Robert, ed.  “The End of Privacy.”  Consumer 
Reports, June 2006.  
U.S. Government. “Measuring Stability and Security in 
Iraq.” Report to Congress, 30 May 2006. Report Online. 
Available from http://www.defenselink.mil/home/ 
features/Iraq_Reports/Index.html; Internet; accessed 2 
June 2006. 
White, Jonathan.  Defending the Homeland: Domestic 
Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security.  Toronto: 
Wadsworth/Thompson, 2004. 
White, Michael. “Iraq Coalition Casualty Count,” 
Icasualties, 1 June 2006 [homepage]; available from 
http://www.icasualties.org/oif/ default.aspx; 













INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
 
